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LANDOWNERS' FCC DILEMMA:
REREADING THE SUPREME COURT'S

ARMSTRONG OPINION AFTER THE
THIRD CIRCUIT's DEPOLo RULING
Gerald S. Dickinson*

INTRODUCTION

Since Marbury v. Madison, federal courts have been venues that
can adequately review and respond to private claims of injury.'
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the "very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury," and it is the
"dut[y] of government . . to afford that protection." 2 The Supreme
Court has been relatively consistent by implying private claims
against the government where a particular statute is silent as to

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

1Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2 Id.

218
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whether there is a private cause of action.3 Indeed, private actors
have called upon federal courts to review unconstitutional
government action. 4
The Supreme Court has historically been quite content to allow
private causes of action based on common law. 5 Ex parte Young is
one of the better-known examples of the Supreme Court's
recognition of the ability of private actors to challenge state
regulations as forms of monetary confiscations in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 6 There, the
Court allowed railroad stockholders to sue a state official instead of
the state. 7 The Court explained that federal courts, like state courts,
"should, at all times, be opened" to claimants "for the purpose of
protecting their property and their legal rights." 8 Indeed, property
rights were at the center of the debate in Ex parte Young, and it
would seem to be in contravention of basic principles of property
law for courts to shutout property owners from pursuing private
causes of action in federal court against governments allegedly
violating federal statutory or constitutional law.
Yet, in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., the Court has
taken a turn in the other direction, by refusing to provide avenues
for relief to private actors against the state in federal court and
finding that the Supremacy Clause does not provide for an implied
right of action to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state

3Judith

&

Resnick, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Privateof Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasureof Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804 (2016).
4 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1390 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
I See Resnick, supra note 3, at 2804.
6 Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
7 Id. at 129.
8 Id. at 165. See generally Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex Parte Young: Once
Controversial, Now Canon, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 247-99 (Vicki C. Jackson
Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
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officers. 9 Many critics, including the four dissenting Justices,
question the wisdom of the ruling generally.1 0 But from a property
rights perspective, the decision sheds light on a dilemma
unforeseen by many scholars and made most apparent by a recent
Third Circuit decision, Jeffrey DePolo v. Board of Supervisors Tredyffmn
Township, et al.11
The Armstrong decision extends beyond foreclosing private
parties from invoking equitable powers of the federal courts to
require states to comply with portions of the Medicaid Act. The
decision also forecloses an inconspicuous subset of private
landowners -amateur radio enthusiasts desiring to construct
amateur radio towers on their property -from pursuing equitable
relief where local zoning ordinances directly conflict with federal
regulation 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b) and Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) declaratory ruling, PRB-1. This article brings to
light an uncomfortable result for private landowners seeking relief
in federal court against local government actions that violate federal
regulations.
I.

ARMSTRONG FORECLOSES PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION

In Armstrong, the Court held that the federal Medicaid Act does
not authorize a private right of action in light of the Supremacy
Clause's prohibition against conferring such action. 12 The case came
out of Idaho, where the state's Medicaid Plan has provisions that
reimburse providers of "habilitation services" by the State's
Department of Health and Welfare.' 3 Section 30(A) of the Medicaid
Act provides that Idaho's plan must "assure that payments are

9

Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383.
1 0 Id. at 1390 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
11 DePolo v. Bd. of Supervisors Tredyffrin Twp., 835 F.3d 381 (2016).
12 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384.
13 Id. at 1382.
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consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are
sufficient to enlist enough providers" while "safeguard[ing] against
unnecessary utilization of ... care and services." 14
The providers sued the Idaho Health and Welfare Department
officials, claiming that the reimbursement rates were lower than
what § 30(A) allows, and sought to enjoin the Department to
increase these rates. 15 The Idaho District Court found for the
providers at summary judgment and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 16
The overarching reasoning behind both decisions was that the
Supremacy Clause gave the providers an implied right of action.17
Thus, the providers could sue to seek an injunction requiring Idaho
to comply with § 30(a). 18
The Supreme Court reversed. 19 The opinion, authored by Justice
Antonin Scalia, said that nothing in the Supremacy Clause's text
suggests a conferral of a private right of action. 20 Scalia wrote that it
is unlikely that the Constitution gave Congress broad discretion
with regard to the enactment of laws, while simultaneously limiting
Congress's power over the manner of their implementation, as this
would result in federal actors being unable to enforce federal law. 21
The Court noted, however, that suits could proceed in federal
courts in equity, if the statute did not explicitly or implicitly
prohibit private enforcement. Yet, the Medicaid Act at issue in
Armstrong establishes "Congress's intent to foreclose equitable

14
15

1

Medicaid Act § 30(A), 42 U.S.C.
Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1382.

§ 1396a(a)(30)(A).

6Id.

Id. at 1383.
8 Id.
19 Id. at 1388.
2 Id. at 1383.
17

1

21

Id. at 1383-84.
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relief."2 Traditionally, the ability to sue against state and federal
officers' unconstitutional actions was a creation of the courts of
equity, but the Court in Armstrong ruled that such a "judge-made
remedy" does not rely upon an implied right of action under the
Supremacy Clause.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, argued that Ex parte Young is the
Court's guiding case, "giving 'life to the Supremacy Clause,'"2 and
that a "long history" of jurisprudence supports the proposition that
private actors may enforce the Supremacy Clause by suing to enjoin
preempted state action; federal courts, by extension, may grant
injunctive relief against state actors violating federal law. 24 The crux
of Sotomayor's disagreement is that the majority's decision permits
federal suits to "enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal
officers [as] . . . the creation of courts of equity," rather than resting

"upon an implied right of action contained in the Supremacy
Clause."a

Id. at 1385 (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635,
647 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Id. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985)).
24 Id. at 1391.
2 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384. When federal courts enforced common law rights,
questions have emerged about whether such rights were part of a general common
law and could thus be interpreted and shaped by federal judges, or whether such
rights derived from remedial structures provided by states. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr.
& Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The
Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. Rev. 609 (2015). Bellia and Clark interpret
the history to demonstrate that "the local law of a particular sovereign ... determined
the causes of action that its courts could adjudicate," id. at 638, and that variation
existed in "the forms and modes of proceeding" in England and various of the
American states, id. at 637. The compromise, in their view, in the First Judiciary Act
was that causes of action "were matters of local law," to which Section 34 required
federal courts to apply state law, just as the federal courts had to borrow forms of
proceeding from the states in which they sat. Id. at 639.
22
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Sotomayor's dissent could be interpreted as a warning call to a
broad array of private actors seeking relief against local and state
governments acting in violation of federal law. But her dissent also
offers a through-line that directly implicates landowners seeking
relief from local zoning ordinances in conflict with federal
regulations. She notes:
A suit, like this one, that seeks relief against state officials
acting pursuant to a state law allegedly preempted by a
federal statute falls comfortably within this doctrine. A
claim that a state law contravenes a federal statute is
"basically constitutional in nature, deriving its force from
the operation of the Supremacy Clause." 26
Indeed, as a result of the Armstrong decision, the "vitality" of Ex
parte Young and the implied right of action are under siege,
throwing into limbo many private actors who attempt to obtain
equitable relief against state officials who violate federal laws, rules,
or regulations. Sotomayor raises a pertinent question of preemption
that comes directly into play for an inconspicuous subset of
landowners who seek to engage in activity on land to satisfy a
particular hobby. In an odd turn of decades of jurisprudence
providing for an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause, ham radio enthusiasts may be left without federal avenues
of relief where local zoning ordinances and board decisions are
arguably preempted by federal regulations.

See Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1392 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Douglas v.
Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 271-272 (1977)) (emphasis added).
26
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II.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN ZONING

In DePolo, the landowner was an experienced amateur radio
operator holding an amateur radio license issued by the FCC. 27
Licensed radio amateurs are sometimes referred to as "hams."28
This advanced form of radio use requires antennas that are higher
than local trees and terrain obstructions in order to communicate
with remote locations. 29 Amateur radio communications are
routinely conducted across international borders.3 0 There are nearly
700,000 hams in the United States, 31 and most of these hams use
their access to radio spectrum for recreational purposes. 32 These
hobbyists engage in radio communications experimentation and
operations, but they have also been given a mandate by the federal
government to provide emergency communications support when
necessary.33 Government officials have recognized the usefulness of
the hams' voluntary role in communications emergencies and have
provided funding to further prepare hams for such duties.3
As with many land use activities, local governments and
neighbors have had negative reactions to antenna structures and
towers, particularly when the ham antenna towers are located in
residential neighborhoods. 3 Local governments have enacted
zoning provisions restricting the height of ham radio antenna

27

2

See DePolo v. Bd. of Supervisors Tredyffrin Twp., 835 F.3d 381, 382 (2016).

Id.

Id. at 383-383.
See Brennan T. Price, Reasonable Accommodation of Amateur Radio Communications by
Zoning Authorities: The FCC'sPRB-1 Preemption, 37 CONN. L.R. 321, 325 (2004).
31 Id.
29

3

32 Id.
3

Id. at 324.

3Id. at 325.
3 See DePolo

v. Bd. of Supervisors Tredyffrin Twp., 835 F.3d 381, 385 (2016).
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towers. 36 Most land use experts and scholars recognize that such
land arrangements and regulations invite property disputes.37
Such local ordinances impinge on radio hams' ability to utilize
radio technology. The concern for hams is that zoning regulations
sometimes preclude the operation of the radio antennae by
restricting the height to a point where the frequency bands for
communication are completely cut off, thus inhibiting the hams'
ability to communicate, and at worst, blocking correspondence
during emergency events, such as natural disasters.38 There is a
direct connection between a ham's antenna height and his or her
ability to properly transmit signals. 39 Indeed, the overarching
concern is that zoning ordinances may hinder the use of amateur
stations or totally preclude amateur communications.
As a result of the hams' concerns, Congress established policy
to protect ham communications under Section 10(a) of the Federal
Communications Authorization Act of 1988.40 Congress recognized

3 See, e.g., id. at 383.
37

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (4th ed.
2013) (discussing contexts of land use disputes between landowners, neighbors and
local government). See also Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 121, 128-29, 81 A.2d 533, 537
(1951). Chief Justice Bell of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once stated:
Does the antenna mast which the petitioner-appellant intends to build in

the back yard of his home and which is used for amateur radio
communication violate the ordinance of the [town]...Does the fact that this
mast (and antenna) are considerably larger than the usual mast (and
antenna) take it out of the permitted and customary uses? We believe that
to so hold would place an unnecessary and unwarranted block in the road
of progress and in the legitimate enjoyment of private property. The
Township Commissioners wish to protect and improve their community;
they do not wish it to become unsightly or to have their property
depreciate in value; and they believe both of these results would occur if a
large number of property owners were permitted to erect similar or
perhaps larger masts.

3 See Price, supra note 30, at 326.
3 Pentel v. City of Mendota Heights, 13 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir.1994).
4 See Price, supra note 30, at 324.
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the emergency communication benefits of hams to strike a balance
between the federal interest in promoting the amateur operations
and the legitimate interests of local governments in regulating local
zoning matters. 41 What followed was a comprehensive set of rules
that the FCC adopted to regulate the amateur radio service.
First, the FCC concluded that it would not "specify any
particular height limitation below which a local government may
not regulate," nor would it "suggest the precise language that must
be contained in local ordinances, such as mechanisms for special
exceptions, variances, or conditional use permits." 42
However, the FCC was also confident that state and local
governments would afford appropriate recognition to the important
federal interest at stake. The FCC regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b),
concerning amateur radio activity at the local level, states:
Except as otherwise provided herein, a station antenna
structure may be erected at heights and dimensions
sufficient
to
accommodate
amateur
service
communications. (State and local regulation of a station
antenna structure must not preclude amateur service
communications. Rather, it must reasonably accommodate
such communications and must constitute the minimum
practicable regulation to accomplish the state or local
authority's legitimate purpose. See PRB-1, 101 FCC 2d 952
(1985) for details.)43
Thus, the FCC imposed a reasonableness restriction on zoning
ordinances. The FCC mandated that local regulations involving

In the Matter of Federal Preemption of State and Local Regulations Pertaining to
Amateur Radio Facilities, 101 F.C.C.2d 952, 960 1 22 (1985) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter PRB-1].
42 PRB-1, 101 F.C.C.2d 952, 960 (1985) (emphasis added).
4 Station Antenna Structures, 47 CFR § 97.15(e) (1999).
41
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placement, screening, or height requirements for antennas based on
health, safety, or aesthetic considerations must be crafted to
"reasonably accommodate" amateur communications.44
The FCC then issued a limited preemption policy. 45 PRB-1 was
intended "to strike a balance between the federal interest in
promoting amateur operations and the legitimate interests of local
governments in regulating local zoning matters." 46 The rule has
limited, rather than complete, federal preemptive effect on local
zoning ordinances, and is only preempted when a local
municipality fails to enact or apply a local zoning ordinance in a
manner that reasonably accommodates amateur communications. 47
The preemptive effect of PRB-1 has been upheld by several federal
appeals courts.48
III.

A.

THE PRIVATE PROPERTY DILEMMA IN DEPOLO

BACKGROUND: DEPOLO'S 180-FooT TOWER REQUEST

On November 25, 2013, DePolo submitted a building permit to
the Tredyffrin Township zoning officer to construct a 180-foot
professionally installed amateur radio tower in his own backyard. 49
His application stated that the proposed tower would be made of
steel lattice with a fifteen-foot wide base and nine-inch wide legs
and would enable DePolo to communicate by radio with other

44 Id.

4 PRB-1, 101 F.C.C.2d at 959-60 1 24.
46 Id. at 959 1 22.
47 Id. at 960 1 25.
4 See, e.g., Evans v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Boulder, 994 F.2d 755, 760-61
(10th Cir.1993); Themes v. City of Lakeside Park, 779 F.2d 1187, 1188-89 (6th
Cir.1986) (per curiam); Williams v. City of Columbia, 906 F.2d 994,998 (4th Cir.1990);
Howard v. City of Burlingame, 937 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1991); Pentel v. City of
Mendota Heights, 13 F.3d 1261, 1261 (8th Cir. 1994).
49
See DePolo v. Bd. of Supervisors Tredyffrin Twp., 835 F.3d 381, 385 (2016).
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operators as far away as Europe. 5 Upon review, the Township
zoning officer denied DePolo's application.51 In doing so, the zoning
officer relied on § 208-18(G) of the Tredyffrin Township zoning
ordinance, which limits the height of structures in the R/2 Residence
zoning district to 35 feet. 52 The zoning officer recognized the tension
between the Township's height restriction and existing
Pennsylvania state law, which provides that no "ordinance,
regulation, plan or any other action shall restrict amateur radio
antenna height to less than 65 feet above ground level," 53 and
offered DePolo a compromise whereby he could construct a 65-foot
antenna and tower.5
DePolo, unhappy with the denial of his 180-foot tower request,
appealed to the Tredyffrin Township Zoning Hearing Board,
arguing that the zoning officer erred in denying the permit for a
180-foot tower, because PRB-1 preempts the Township ordinance
from restricting antenna height at 35 feet.55 The Zoning Hearing
Board rejected DePolo's argument and instead, granted DePolo a
variance for a 65-foot tower.56 The Board reviewed the matter by
juxtaposing the three levels of regulation at issue - the municipal
ordinance, the state statute, and the FCC regulation 57- concluding

5 Id.
5 Id.
52 Id.

5 See Restriction on Municipal Regulation of Amateur Radio Service
Communications, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(b) (2008).
- See DePolo, 835 F.3d at 385.
-s See DePolo v. Bd. of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Twp. 105 F. Supp. 3d 484, 487 (2015).
56 See DePolo, 835 F.3d at 385.
5 Tredyffrin Zoning Ordinance §208-18, 19(G) (stating "Height. The height of any
building shall not exceed 35 feet"). 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 302(a)-(b) (2008):
(b) Reasonable accommodations--A municipality may impose necessary
regulations to ensure the safety of amateur radio antenna structures, but
must reasonably accommodate amateur service communications. No

ordinance, regulation, plan or any other action shall restrict amateur radio
antenna height to less than 65 feet above ground level. Id. (emphasis added).
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that the proposed 180-foot tower was "not compatible" with the
surrounding residential neighborhood and "would create an
adverse visual impact on the neighborhood," - as the proposed
height of 180-feet would greatly exceed the height of the residences
in the area. 59
Further, the Board stated that the tower's "height, mass, and
latticework design" was "of a type universally associated with. . . a
factory area or industrialized complex" and posed a safety hazard
because its fall radius extended well into neighboring properties. 60
While acknowledging that PRB-1 still gave local municipalities the
right to regulate the height of structures, the Board noted that a
local community that wants to preserve residential areas as livable
neighborhoods may adopt zoning regulations that forbid the
construction and installation in a residential neighborhood of the
type of antenna that is commonly and universally associated with
those that one finds in a factory area or an industrialized complex. 61
With respect to DePolo's preemption argument, the Board
stated that "[rlegardless, where the height limitations of the Zoning
Ordinance are not absolute and can ... be varied or modified, they

Station Antenna Structures 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b) (1999):
(b) Except as otherwise provided herein, a station antenna structure may
be erected at heights and dimensions sufficient to accommodate amateur

service communications. (State and local regulation of a station antenna
structure must not preclude amateur service communications. Rather, it must
reasonablyaccommodate such communications and must constitute the minimum
practicable regulation to accomplish the state or local authority's legitimate
purpose. See PRB-1, 101 FCC 2d 952 (1985)for details. Id. (emphasis added).
5 See DePolo, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 487.
9 See DePolo, 835 F.3d at 385.
6 Id.
61 See In re Modification and Clarification of Policies and Procedures Governing
Siting and Maintenance of Amateur Radio Antennas and Support Structures, and
Amendment of Section 97.15 of the Commission's Rules Governing the Amateur
Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 22151, 22154 (2000).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 11:218

230

cannot be considered absolute or unvarying." 62 DePolo did not
appeal that decision to the state trial court and instead, filed in
federal district court.

63

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania subsequently granted the Township's
Board of Supervisors and the Zoning Hearing Board's motions to
dismiss, concluding that the 65-foot variance offered was a
reasonable accommodation and the zoning ordinance was not
preempted by PRB-1.4 DePolo then appealed to the Third Circuit.
B.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT DECISION IN DEPOLO

The Third Circuit refused to weigh the merits of DePolo's
preemption claim due to a procedural defect that proved to be
fatal.65 The panel noted, "[WIhile DePolo was aggrieved by the
[Zoning Hearing Board's] decision limiting the variance to 65-feet,
he had adequate opportunity to litigate the matter beyond the
[Zoning Hearing Board] by appealing to the appropriate Court of
Common Pleas within thirty days of the Zoning Hearing Board's
decision." 66 Instead, DePolo filed a lawsuit in federal court,
allowing the thirty-day appeal period to expire under Pennsylvania
state law. The Court stated that this was fatal, as DePolo was
"bound by the final judgment of the [Zoning Hearing Board]," 67
which was entitled to preclusive effect in federal court.68 As such,

62

DePolo, 835 F.3d at 386.

63 Id. at 383.

6 See id.
6
5 Id. at 387.
66
Id.

Id.; see also Ridley Sch. Dist. v. MR., 680 F.3d 260, 283 (3d Cir. 2012).
6 See DePolo, 835 F.3d at 383 (citing Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange
Rockland Utils., 159 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Univeristy of Tennessee v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986)); Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186,
189 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Decisions of state administrative agencies that have been
&

67
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the Third Circuit dismissed the suit. The Third Circuit did
acknowledge that the decision "leaves amateur radio enthusiasts
with limited avenues into federal court." 69 The federal district court
could have narrowly addressed the question of preemption if
DePolo had appealed the Zoning Hearing Board's decision to the
Court of Common Pleas, and then stayed the matter in
Pennsylvania state court until a resolution on his federal claims
were completed. 70
IV.

LANDOWNERS' FCC DILEMMA

As a result of Armstrong, the door may be effectively closed to
private causes of action in federal court against local officials who
are allegedly in violation of a federal regulation. Underlying the
DePolo holding is the inexorable conclusion that, regardless of how
the court in DePolo decided, similarly situated litigants like DePolo
may be unable to file a private cause of action and seek relief in
federal court.71 As noted, Armstrong seems to imply that a private
right (or cause) of action is prohibited where the statute (or
regulation in DePolo) at issue either explicitly or implicitly prohibits

reviewed by state courts are... given preclusive effect in federal courts."); Caver v.
City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 259 (3d Cir.2005).
69 See DePolo, 835 F.3d at n.18.
70 Id.
The Court raised the Armstrong dilemma with the parties, who had failed to
identify the issue, one week before oral argument, by requesting supplemental
briefing and then raising the issue briefly at oral argument on January 12, 2016.
However, based on the DePolo opinion, the Court decided not to entertain Armstrong
and instead ruled on the preclusive effect issue, effectively leaving the Armstrong
dilemma a question unanswered for ham landowners who seek relief in federal
court. See Clerk's Letter to Counsel (Jan. 4, 2016) DePolo v. Bd. of Supervisors
Tredyffrin Twp., No. 15-2495 (835 F.3d 381 (3rd Cir. 2016)). Both litigants in DePolo
assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and neither initially raised the issue of
whether DePolo had a private cause of action in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, until
the Court sought additional briefing on the issue.
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private enforcement. The Medicaid Act at issue in Armstrong was
explicit in its intent to preclude equitable relief. DePolo unveils the
potential reach of Armstrong beyond Medicaid providers, including
ham radio enthusiasts, and possibly many more private actors.
Two issues arise in DePolo as a result of Armstrong. Did the FCC
regulations, as drafted by Congress, expressly authorize private
causes of action or did the regulation indicate Congress's clear and
unambiguous intent to create a private cause of action for violations
of the FCC regulations? If they did not, how can ham radio
enthusiasts seek relief in federal court to enjoin similar violations
under PRB-1?
It is possible that Congress did not authorize such causes of
action, as the Communications Act of 1934 "did not create new
private rights" and the "purpose of the Act was to protect the
public interest in communications" and that private actors could
only have standing as "representatives of the public interest."n This
reading would neatly fit with the Armstrong decision, which
endorses the notion that the Supremacy Clause does not give
private actors a constitutional right to enforce federal law against
states. 73 Thus, a suit seeking the enforcement of PRB-1 on
preemption grounds would, as expressed in Armstrong, be
prohibited. In other words, peering closely at the Armstrong
decision, it is possible that ham radio landowners do not have a
private right or cause of action under the FCC regulations to enjoin
a Zoning Hearing Board officers' denial of a landowner's building
permit application; a denial that may conflict with PRB-1's partial
federal preemption rule. This is a revelation in private-public
disputes between landowners, the state, and the federal

See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1941).
See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (quoting Golden
State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989)).
7
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government that was once unforeseen. So how can DePolo, and
future ham radio enthusiasts, sue in federal court to enjoin
preemption violations if a private cause of action is prohibited?
They cannot. The state has to do it for them.
The plaintiff's "sole remedy" in Armstrong, in light of
foreclosing private causes of action, is for the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to take action. Similarly, for DePolo, the only
path to federal court is one over which he has very little control. It
requires him to ask the FCC to demand the attorney general to
enforce its powers conferring jurisdiction on the district courts upon
application by alleging failure to comply with federal regulations. 74
The Third Circuit in DePolo highlighted this rather limited avenue
for relief in a footnote in the opinion, stating that "Alternatively, the
FCC has enforcement powers, conferring jurisdiction on the District
Courts of the United States 'upon application of the Attorney
General of the United States at the request of the Commission,
alleging a failure to comply with or a violation of any of the
provisions."' 7 5 To most appellate practitioners, jurists, and scholars,
this is clearly an untenable option for private actors seeking to
enjoin federal preemption violations by local governments in
zoning disputes.
While Medicaid is a massive governmental operation with
substantial resources, the FCC has made it clear that it does not
have the ability to review all state and local laws that affect amateur
operations. The FCC has encouraged state and local governments to
legislate in a manner that would avoid conflict with federal policy. 76
Where land use conflicts at the local level cannot be resolved by
state administrative agencies or state courts, the FCC would

7
7
76

47 U.S.C. § 401 (1934).
See DePolo v. Bd. of Supervisors Tredyffrin Twp., 835 F.3d 381, 387 n.18 (2016).
See PRB-1, 101 F.C.C.2d 952, 960 1 26.
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probably prefer that federal courts keep their doors open to resolve
the matters once the claimants come knocking. The FCC does not
have the resources to be a national zoning board, responsible for
adjudicating local land use conflicts, nor was it established to
administer decisions and review claims individually.?
To leave relief for private actors in the hands of an application
by the attorney general on behalf and at the request of the FCC to
pursue litigation against a local zoning board's alleged violation of
PRB-1 is inadequate. It seems unlikely for such cases to be a top
priority for attorneys general, and thus unlikely to be a satisfactory
form of judicial review, administration of a federal regulation, and
avenue for relief for the landowner.
CONCLUSION

Rereading Armstrong after the Third Circuit's DePolo decision
raises a ham radio landowners' dilemma with very limited
plausible federal avenues for relief where preemption of FCC
regulations are at issue. This means that ham radio enthusiasts may
be effectively closed off from enjoining violations of federal
regulations by local municipalities, unless the attorney general and
the FCC in coordination seek judicial review on behalf of the
private landowner. As noted, the Third Circuit raised the Armstrong
dilemma with the parties in briefing. However, the Court's ruling
focused on the preclusive effect issue, thus effectively leaving the
private cause of action issue raised in Armstrong a question
unanswered for ham landowners who seek relief in federal court.
Unlike the Third Circuit, another federal court may invoke the
Armstrong decision explicitly to preclude a ham radio enthusiast
from seeking to enjoin preemption violations by local
municipalities. Congress might want to revisit its FCC regulations,

7

See Town of Deerfield, New York v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420,436 (2d Cir 1993).
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specifically PRB-1, in light of the DePolo decision to address the
dilemma raised by the Third Circuit and highlighted in this article.
Otherwise, it is unclear to what extent ham radio enthusiasts have
adequate avenues of relief in federal court.
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